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Abstract
The World Health Organization’s Patient Safety Programme created an initiative to improve the safety of surgery around the
world. In order to accomplish this goal the programme team developed a checklist with items that could and, if at all poss-
ible, should be practised in all settings where surgery takes place. There is little guidance in the literature regarding methods
for creating a medical checklist. The airline industry, however, has more than 70 years of experience in developing and using
checklists. The authors of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist drew lessons from the aviation experience to create a safety
tool that supports essential clinical practice. In order to inform the methodology for development of future checklists in
health care, we review how we applied lessons learned from the aviation experience in checklist development to the develop-
ment of the Surgical Safety Checklist and also discuss the differences that exist between aviation and medicine that impact the
use of checklists in health care.
Keywords: quality improvement, quality management, consensus methods, general methodology, surgery, teamwork,
human resources
Introduction
A checklist is ‘a formal list used to identify, schedule,
compare or verify a group of elements or . . . used as a
visual or oral aid that enables the user to overcome the
limitations of short-term human memory’ [1]. The use of
checklists in health care is increasingly common. One of
the ﬁrst widely publicized checklists was for the insertion
of central venous catheters. This checklist, in addition to
other team-building exercises, helped signiﬁcantly decrease
the central line infection rate per 1000 catheter days
from 2.7 at baseline to zero [2]. Building on this early
success, the World Health Organization’s Patient Safety
Programme ‘Safe Surgery Saves Lives’ developed a Surgical
Safety Checklist as a means of improving the safety of
surgical care around the world. In a multinational study
involving eight hospitals from diverse economic settings,
its use improved compliance with standards of care by
65% and reduced the death rate following surgery by
nearly 50% [3].
In order to develop the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist,
the WHO Patient Safety Programme turned to the wealth
of experience in the aviation industry [4]. The goal was to
create a tool that supported clinical practice without
attempting to substitute a rigid algorithm for professional
judgement. We therefore reviewed the aviation experience
and literature on checklists to construct a development
strategy for the Surgical Safety Checklist. In his recent
book The Checklist Manifesto [4], one of the authors
(A.A.G.) provides a perspective for a lay audience on the
role of checklists in multiple industries, but does not
provide a detailed description to guide systems researchers
wishing to develop their own checklists. Here, we describe
more speciﬁcally how lessons from the aviation industry
were applied to the development of the WHO Surgical
Safety Checklist to inform the development of future
medical checklists.
This checklist development process can be broken down
into ﬁve steps: content and format, timing, trial and feed-
back, formal testing and evaluation, and local modiﬁcation.
We believe that these ﬁve steps adapted from the aviation
industry and applied to the development of the WHO
Surgical Safety Checklist can help inform the development of
future medical checklists.
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Content and format
In aviation, checklist developers seek to construct a checklist
as a series of succinct items ideally comprising no more than
a single page [5]. Sentences are intended to be simple and
clear, yet maintain the professional language of the ﬁeld [6].
Type font is legible and uses upper and lower case text.
Clutter and colouring is limited and non-glossy lamination
used when reﬂective glare is anticipated. Most importantly,
the checklist items are associated with actions that allow cor-
rections or modiﬁcations to ensure safety [7]. We tried to
keep all of these lessons in mind as we developed the draft
WHO Surgical Safety Checklist.
The WHO Safe Surgery Saves Lives team began by com-
piling a background document of safety practices with
known beneﬁts to surgical patients. This document was criti-
cal for not only establishing targets for improvement but also
the speciﬁc practices necessary to achieve these targets. The
WHO Patient Safety Programme then convened an inter-
national consultation of experts to review this background
document and suggest additional topics to be considered for
the checklist. These and other steps in the development of
the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist are outlined in Fig. 1. To
ensure that the checklist would be applicable in a wide range
of settings, the international consultation was attended by
participants from low, middle and high income countries
from around the globe.
The topics considered relevant in all operating rooms
around the world by this group of experts were then con-
verted into potential checklist items that were amenable to
verbal conﬁrmation by an operating team and that allowed
corrective action if they were noted to have been overlooked.
Some items were relatively straightforward problems, for
example conﬁrmation of prophylactic antibiotic adminis-
tration. Some required more complicated decision-making,
such as preparation for high blood loss or a difﬁcult airway.
Other checklist items identiﬁed complex problems whose
nature and response could not be fully anticipated. These
items were less concrete but left to the discretion of the clini-
cians to determine, such as a discussion of critical events
that the operating team might anticipate. The overarching
goal was to focus the checklist only on ‘killer items’, those
steps that are most critical, known to often be overlooked,
and that put the patient at the highest risk of harm when
omitted. In this manner the checklist would not and should
not supplant the decision-making of trained professionals,
but would rather remind clinicians of tasks that if forgotten
lead to serious consequences. There is a tendency when
making a checklist to specify every step in care; but to be
efﬁcient and effective, the aviation lesson is to focus on
items that are recognized to either be outright deadly if
missed or, if not deadly, then high risk and known to be
recurrently overlooked or missed.
As we learned from the airline industry, each item con-
sidered for inclusion was created as a simple check rather
than an algorithm. It needed to be associated with a correc-
tive action that would bring the team using the checklist into
procedural compliance with expected standards without dic-
tating how that action should be performed. Each potential
safety step was carefully considered by an international group
of surgeons, anaesthetists, nurses, biomedical engineers and
other patient safety experts. Because errors of omission and
commission are usually not well-recognized or publicized
and because medical simulation is not nearly as advanced as
simulation in the aviation industry [4], these practitioners
provided expert consensus estimates of where errors occur.
Figure 1 Development process of WHO Surgical Safety Checklist.
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The tension between comprehensiveness and practicability
was carefully evaluated with a goal of creating a checklist that
prompted team communication and interaction, was widely
applicable, would save lives and could be completed in 60–
90 s in most situations.
Timing
In aviation, checklists are designed around operational work-
ﬂow patterns, such as before takeoff or landing, when the
ﬂight crew can conﬁrm that critical steps have been com-
pleted while detection of their omission is still remediable.
They are explicitly designed to promote adherence to basic
standards through a process known as ‘error trapping’ [8, 9].
The theory long understood by the airline industry is that
humans make errors and checklists allow these to be ident-
iﬁed and remedied before they cause harm [4].
For the timing of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist, the
team identiﬁed three phases in the workﬂow pattern that had
natural ‘pause points’ in the typical workﬂow—one prior to
induction of anaesthesia, one prior to skin incision and one
prior to the patient leaving the operating room—when
simple yet important actions could be conﬁrmed and per-
formed if needed. The checklist did not dictate how these
actions were to be done, or in what sequence, just that they
were verbally conﬁrmed to have been done prior to com-
mencing with the next stage of operative care, or if they had
been overlooked, that corrective action was taken.
Trial and feedback
Once an aviation checklist is created, the developers trial it
and solicit feedback [10]. This strategy is based on the
Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) model of quality control familiar
to industry and manufacturing [11, 12]. Since engineers,
pilots, human factors experts and ﬂight mechanics all con-
tribute to the crafting of a checklist, simulators are used to
evaluate functionality. The balance between brevity and com-
prehensiveness is carefully scrutinized and reﬁnements are
made based on experience. This is done rapidly and without
great formality, allowing improvements in content and
format before the checklist is widely disseminated.
The Safe Surgery Saves Lives initiative tried to emulate
this step by subjecting each draft checklist to a trial with
one team. Some steps that had seemed self-evident were
found to be unclear and problems with logistics, timing and
team interactions inevitably arose. During each trial of a
checklist, clinical teams clariﬁed actions and language that
were confusing. Once it was reﬁned and in use in one
setting, it was trialled in a variety of other settings. After a
sufﬁcient number of trials, the checklist was put into wider
practice. Identifying and correcting problems early in the
process minimized resistance and reduced barriers to
implementation.
Formal testing and evaluation
Formal evaluation of aviation checklists demonstrates efﬁcacy
and functionality [13]. Their use must improve compliance
with the processes described, engage the team in a meaning-
ful way and be an integral part of the workﬂow [9, 14]. This
is most often done through observation and measurement of
the processes that are addressed in the checklist [15].
The use of a surgical checklist faced signiﬁcant resistance
and scepticism, so evaluating its effect on patient care and
outcome was considered essential for success. In addition
to process measures typical of aviation, the programme
built into its study a formal evaluation of surgical outcomes.
This added a substantial burden to data collection and the
cost of formal testing and evaluation. The results, however,
were a critical demonstration of the importance of such a
safety tool and its potential impact on clinical care [3].
Local modification
Aviation checklists are not overly rigid or proscriptive. Airline
companies often modify checklists provided to them by air-
craft manufacturers to identify and formalize procedures
speciﬁc to company policy [16]. These modiﬁcations usually
reﬂect airline culture and local procedures while attempting
to maintain the focus, brevity and action-oriented steps that
make a checklist workable [8]. Deletion of items from the
manufacturer’s recommended checklist is rare. The FAA typi-
cally will require the company to submit its revised checklist
to the manufacturer to ensure that it is not omitting an
essential safety element [13]. Both during the evaluation and
after dissemination of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist,
we encouraged health-care workers and hospital administra-
tors to modify the checklist so that it best ﬁts their local
practice and work ﬂow. Globally, surgical settings are vastly
more diverse than aviation. Therefore, the Safe Surgery
Programme encourages modiﬁcation to ﬁt local context and
circumstance. However, it discourages elimination of any
safety step unless that step was incorporated into another
process that ensures its completion. During evaluation,
modiﬁcations were done with a critical eye and in a colla-
borative context with members from the different disciplines
involved in the process to ensure balance and functionality.
The programme encouraged a rapid-cycle trial and feedback
of the modiﬁed checklist before widespread local dissemina-
tion to help ensure its workability in clinical practice.
Similarities and differences between
aviation and medicine
There are several similarities between aviation and medicine
summarized in Table 1. These similarities include the
complex nature of the tasks coupled with time-critical events
and actions. In both medicine and aviation these complex
tasks are managed by highly trained individuals with a
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Table 1 Summary of similarities between the airline industry and medicine
Similarities
Complexity Complex procedures and processes with a series of critical steps that must occur to ensure the safe
outcome for the patient/passengers
Time-critical events Time-critical event ﬂows and actions
Unpredictability Element of unpredictability (for aviation, unexpected weather events and other external operating
conditions; for medical, patient response to treatment)
Rare deviations Most days have normal procedure and process ﬂows, but a variety of deviations may occur
requiring urgent response; some of these deviations are extremely rare
Lengthy training Highly trained professionals involving many years of training
Hierarchy A team of professionals, with a gradient of authority present in the team. Often a single person
is designated as the ﬁnal authority for the safe outcome of the ﬂight/procedure/process
Highly visible
implications
As an industry, the practices result in highly visible public safety implications
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 2 Summary of differences between the airline industry and medicine
Differences
Personal risk The pilot’s fate is tied to the fate of passengers; in the doctor/patient relationship, only the
patient’s safety is at risk
Public perception Passengers are not often aware of the errors that pilots make. Medical errors are more
frequently visible to the patient or their family
Litigation Doctors are more often the principle target of litigation when errors occur in medicine. This
impacts how voluntary reporting systems are used: NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) effectively results in immunity for the reporter in most cases, and is very widely used by
pilots. Doctors are often reluctant to report errors in their systems because of the potential for
litigation
Level of training and roles Most surgical procedures are performed by one surgeon (with resident, etc. assisting) resulting
in a single high-authority ﬁgure. Air carriers are two-crew, the captain and ﬁrst ofﬁcer trade the
‘pilot ﬂying’ role on alternate ﬂights. The other pilot role is ‘pilot monitoring’ and their job is to
catch and report errors. This yields a high probability of catching errors
Authority structure within
team
Flight crew authority gradient is improving over time with Crew Resource Management
adoption. Medical teams are generally autocratic, with even more extreme authority gradient in
some developing countries, so there is little opportunity for error catching due to cross-check
Culture of standardization Pilot culture generally accepts Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), with disciplined use of
procedures and checklists; medical culture values extreme level of knowledge, judgment and
expertise, but is resistant to imposed SOPs, rigor or discipline
Oversight Pilots’ performance is subject to random checks by Line Check Airmen, regulatory observation,
recurrent training and checking, and Flight Operations Quality Assurance performance data
gathering. Doctors are subject to less formal oversight and less frequent mandatory ongoing
training
Labour Unions Pilots are represented by labour unions in many parts of the world, so feedback or discipline
due to errors is often done with the union as intermediary. Health-care workers are sometimes
members of unions, but these unions do not usually act as intermediaries in incidents involving
patient harm
Litigation If a pilot violates the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), they are subject to the provisions
of the FARs, which are federal laws. Litigation is a potential consequence of medical error, but
very few errors committed by health-care workers are a direct violation of the law
Outside authority Pilot procedures have an original authoritative source with the aircraft manufacturer (OEM,
or Original Equipment Manufacturer). The medical community is a group of peers, generally
without a single authoritative source of procedures and standards
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hierarchy in the team structure that supports rapid responses
and decision-making when deviations from normal protocol
occur.
Although the aviation model was useful for informing the
process of checklist creation, surgical checklist development
and implementation involves additional challenges and differ-
ences outlined in Table 2. In general, the operating room
environment and patient’s condition are markedly more vari-
able than an aeroplane cockpit, which is relatively constant
and engineered for safety. Surgical care occurs in a highly
complex and often poorly structured environment, as
patients present to diverse practice settings with an astound-
ing variety of conditions that must be simultaneously recog-
nized and managed. In addition, aviation brieﬁngs are a
normal and expected component of pre-ﬂight planning and
culture; the Surgical Safety Checklist had to engender com-
munication and information exchange through a brieﬁng
process built into the checklist itself. Finally, after more than
70 years of use in aviation checklists are nearly universally
accepted and valued. The traditional culture of surgery is
rigid and resists changes to convention, including the intro-
duction of checklists, which are not part of its traditional
practice pattern.
Conclusion and future applications
Over the past 70 years the airline industry has learned a
great deal about the science of developing checklists. The use
of medical checklists to improve the safety and reliability of
clinical practice has gained increased attention and there are
emerging discussions in the literature on strategies to develop
checklists for health care [17, 18]. Checklists have been
shown to help improve clinical outcomes in obstetrics, anaes-
thesia care, emergency departments and in intensive care
units to prevent ventilator-associated pneumonia and central
line-associated bloodstream infections [2, 19–22]. In
addition, the WHO Patient Safety Programme has now
shown that a checklist can be of beneﬁt in both wealthy and
resource-poor environments. There are numerous clinical set-
tings in developed and developing countries where team
checklists are likely to be beneﬁcial. From childbirth to trauma
care to the work-up of fever or diarrhoeal illness, checklists
can help teams improve adherence to important, life-saving
steps in the process of care.
Checklists alone cannot solve the complex clinical issues
that need to be addressed to improve adherence to best prac-
tices at the bedside and it is critical that each checklist be care-
fully designed and evaluated to ensure that it supports rather
than interferes with clinical care. There also needs to be a
strategy for translating the component elements of the check-
list into clinical practice [23]. Simply providing clinicians with
a checklist will not provide them with the resources to com-
plete the checklist nor will it create a culture of safety that we
see in the airline industry, which encourages the use of the
checklist. Incorporating checklists into practice requires a con-
certed, energy-intensive mechanism to promote teamwork
and communication and reinforce training and knowledge.
This allows clinical teams to focus on the complex issues
while ensuring that simple ones are addressed for every
patient, every time. Feedback and continued monitoring are
also essential to ensure that care is comprehensive, efﬁcient,
effective and safe. This is truly the height of professionalism,
and it is hoped that the experience of the WHO Patient
Safety Programme will be instructive as the science of devel-
oping team checklists for medicine evolves.
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